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NOTES ON DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THE
WELFARE STATE
Assaf Razin*
“We wanted to import only labor, but we ended up importing people.”
The Labor Minister in Germany, in the early 1990s.
The ﬂow of unskilled, low-earning migrants to developed countries
with a comprehensive social security system, including retirement bene-
ﬁts, has attracted both public and academic attention in recent years.
Being relatively low earners, the migrants typically are net beneﬁciaries
of the welfare state in the short run.1 Therefore, an almost unanimous
opposition to migration may arise in the potential host countries. This
phenomenon of host-country resistance has been modeled by Wildasin
(1994), Razin and Sadka (1995), and others.
An important pillar of such a welfare state, and more and more the
focus of attention in recent years, is the pension system. It is commonly
agreed that the pay-as-you-go system is heavily burdened in most
industrialized countries and is in need of reform.2 For instance, Gruber
and Wise (1999, p. 34) state that “the populations in all industrialized
countries are aging rapidly, and individual life expectancies are increas-
ing. Yet older workers are leaving the labor force at younger and younger
ages. Together, these trends have put enormous pressure on the ﬁnancial
solvency of social security systems around the world.” In many countries,
the theoretical tax (contribution) rates, that is, the rates that would
balance the social security system, are signiﬁcantly higher than the
statutory rates. For example, Brugiavini (1999) reports that this theoretical
rate would have been 44 percent for Italy in 1991.
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1 See, for instance, Lalonde and Topel (1997); Borjas (1994); Borjas and Trejos (1991).
2 For a survey of various reform proposals see Heller (1998).Generational accounting provides insight into the ﬁscal pressures
arising from aging populations. By explicitly taking into account the
government intertemporal budget constraints, this methodology assesses
the present value of taxes that individuals at different age cohorts need to
pay over their remaining lifetimes to ﬁnance the future stream of public
expenditures. (See Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Leibfritz 1999.) Recent stud-
ies have drawn attention to the high net tax burdens facing the young and
middle-aged populations of the industrialized economies under current
tax and transfer policies, because current transfers to the elderly are
generous compared to their earlier contributions to the system. In the
globalized world economy, though, the current ﬁscal systems could last
longer, if the net pension liabilities were partly ﬁnanced by foreign
savings. International migration could bring help to the system by
enlarging the tax base.
Thus, migration may have some important implications for the
ﬁnancial soundness of the pension system. As The Economist succinctly
put it: “Demography and economics together suggest that Europe might
do better to open its doors wider. Europeans now live longer and have
fewer babies than they used to. The burden of a growing host of elderly
people is shifting onto a dwindling number of young shoulders” (Feb-
ruary 15, 1992). Projected public pension spending reaches the level of at
least 14 percent of national income by 2040 for France, Germany, Japan,
and Italy. Recent United Nations projections indicate the levels of
migration that would keep elderly dependency ratios constant. For the
United States, Japan, and the European Union, the migration required to
stabilize dependency ratios is in the range of 10 to 13 million people a
year, clearly far above recent levels and probably higher than would be
politically and economically feasible. Storesletten (2000) makes a similar
calculation, based on a general equilibrium model, about the rates of
immigration needed for the United States to restrain the pension system
from a ﬁscal explosion.
“Are immigrants an asset or a liability in the provision and ﬁnancing
of public services in the United States?” asks the 1997 book The New
Americans (p. 254). The text goes on to say: “Judging by the 1996 welfare
reform legislation restricting the access of legal and illegal immigrants to
a variety of federally funded transfer programs, citizens’ approval in 1994
of Proposition 187 in California denying funding for public services to
illegal immigrants, and recent suits by Arizona, California, Florida, New
York, New Jersey, and Texas to recover additional funding from the
federal government for immigrant services, many people believe that the
effect is both negative and large.” However, across the immigrant
population, the size of the net ﬁscal burden imposed on native-born
residents varies signiﬁcantly. Households of immigrants who have lower
incomes and include more school-age children impose a relatively heavy
burden, whereas households of immigrants who have higher incomes
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book (based largely on Lee and Miller 1998) reaches the conclusion that
U.S. immigrants provide a net ﬁscal beneﬁt in present value terms, when
account is taken of their own impact on tax receipts, transfers, and
government purchases, as well as the impact of their descendants.
Another aspect of population growth driven by immigration is the
perception that, as Paul Krugman (The New York Times, May 23rd, 2001)
puts it, “other things being the same, a growing population means more
houses, more cars and hence more sprawl. But population growth is only
a secondary contributing factor to a disastrous pattern of land use driven
by skewed incentives that encourage people to spread out in a low-
density sprawl that in turn forces them to spend more and more of their
time in cars.” Krugman sees the (largely off-base) association of immi-
gration and sprawl as a factor behind a small but growing anti-
immigration movement.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY
While it is common sense to expect that young migrants, even if
low-skilled, can help society pay the beneﬁts to the current elderly, it may
nevertheless still be reasonable to argue that these migrants would
adversely affect the current young, if the migrants are net consumers of
the welfare state. But here the ingenuity of Paul Samuelson’s concept of
the economy as an everlasting machine comes into play, even though
each one of its human components is ﬁnitely lived (Samuelson 1958).
Razin and Sadka (1999) employ Samuelson’s concept in a dynamic
model of a welfare state, with an old-age social security system that is
also inherently progressive. They show that even though the immigrants
may be low-skilled and net beneﬁciaries of a pension system, neverthe-
less all the existing income groups (low and high) and age groups (young
and old) living at the time of the immigrants’ arrival would be better off,
provided the economy is relatively small and has good access to
international capital markets. Therefore, on these grounds, the political
economy equilibrium will be overwhelmingly pro-migration in this case.
Furthermore, this migration need not put any burden on future genera-
tions. If the migration episode repeats itself, or if the social security trust
generates a surplus that is used to ﬁnance future beneﬁts, all generations
are made better off. This unambiguous result for the small open economy
obtains whether or not the low-skilled immigrants are net beneﬁciaries of
or net contributors to the old-age social security system. That is, the result
obtains both when the contributions of the immigrants to the pension
system fall short of the present value of their pension beneﬁts and when
they exceed it. Indeed, when the market rate of interest exceeds the
biological rate of interest (the population growth rate), which is usually
the case, and the percentage of skilled workers in the native-born
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be net contributors to the pension system.3
Razin and Sadka next drop the small open economy assumption that
serves to ﬁx factor prices in the wake of migration, either through capital
mobility or through factor-price-equalizing trade in goods. They show
that when migration affects factor prices,4 particularly when it depresses
wages of unskilled labor,5 it may create some anti-immigration elements
that may counterbalance the initial positive effect on the pension system.
Indeed, with a sufﬁciently small substitution between capital and labor,
the factor price effect may well inﬂict losses on some income groups of the
current generations and some future generations.
Does the possibility of “ﬁscal leakage” from the native-born to
low-skilled immigrants imply anything for a related question: What is the
political-economic effect of immigrants on the tax burden and on the level
of redistribution in the host country? Immigrants make income distribu-
tion less desirable to the median voter, because the transfers “leak” to
more workers with the lowest incomes. This effect tends to lower the
political-equilibrium tax rate. Second, immigration reduces the skill level
of the median voter, and this effect increases the tax rate. The empirical
work of Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002a) uses data for eleven European
countries. The labor tax rate is the dependent variable, and the indepen-
dent variables include separate immigrant variables for low-, median-,
and high-education immigrants. The results show that immigration of the
highly skilled lowers the tax burden, while immigration of the low-skilled
raises the tax burden, consistent with the “ﬁscal leakage” effect.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND LOBBYING
The political-economic theory of Grossman and Helpman (1994)
speciﬁes that in choosing the optimal tariff policy, politicians trade off
aggregate welfare against the lobbies’ contributions. The equilibrium rate









3 This intertemporal aspect of the net contribution of low-skilled immigrants to the
welfare state seems to be absent from the static measures of the ﬁscal burden imposed by
immigrants provided in much of the empirical literature cited earlier. The Razin and Sadka
(1999) ﬁnding that the social security ﬁscal burden is not necessarily a good welfare
indicator is another drawback of this literature.
4 This factor price effect of migration arises either when there is an inadequate inﬂow
of capital in conjunction with the inﬂux of labor or when the economy is large enough so as
not to be a price taker in the global economy.
5 For instance, Altonji and Card (1991) ﬁnd that a 1 percent increase in a country’s labor
force due to immigration lowers wages by 1.2 percent.
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ti  the tariff rate (or the tariff equivalent of the import quota),
Ii  {
1, if the sector is organized,
0, if the sector is not organized,
L  the share of population involved in lobbying activity,
a  weight of aggregate welfare in the policymaker utility,
zi  the inverse of the import penetration ratio, and
ei  the price elasticity of import demand.
The tariff (subsidy) is granted according to a modiﬁed Ramsey rule:
the higher the elasticity of import demand (export supply), the smaller
the deviations from free trade. All organized sectors obtain protection.
For the lobbying sectors, protection increases with the share of domestic
production for domestic consumption. Protection, naturally, decreases
with the weight attached by the government to aggregate welfare and
with the share of the population involved in lobbying activities. These
rules extend to policies concerning migration and foreign capital; see
Facchini and Willman (2001).
The protection formula carries over to protection of various factors of
production. The implied tariff rate on factor i, ti, is reinterpreted by




where wi* is the world real wage of input i and wi is the domestic real
wage of the input. If the aggregate production function is separably
additive, the Grossman-Helpman formula is reinstated. If, however, there
are complementarities between inputs (that is, increasing the quantity of
one of them raises the marginal productivity of the other), then a
lobbying substitute will have a positive effect on the protection level
obtained by the other factor. Letting in more imports of either factor
would decrease not only the real wage of that factor itself but also that of
its substitute. The substitute, therefore, also has an incentive to lobby for
protection on behalf of its “partner.” A lobbying complement, on the
other hand, would like to see a lower real wage for the other factor and
has, therefore, a strong incentive to lobby against protection for the other
factor.
Facchini and Willman use a sample of twenty OECD countries and
ﬁnd support for the idea that organized groups inﬂuence policy toward
international factor movements. Complementarities between labor and
capital inputs play a signiﬁcant role in the degree of protection actually
granted. Their ﬁndings support the hypothesis that the degree of protec-
NOTES ON DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THE WELFARE STATE 293tion granted to a factor depends on whether it is organized or not.
Organized factors enjoy a distinct pattern of protection. Furthermore,
Facchini and Willman ﬁnd some evidence to support the hypothesis that
lobbying complements, such as unskilled labor and foreign direct invest-
ment, reduce the degree of protection granted to an organized factor.
The following examples illustrate the link between factor comple-
mentarity and lobbying activity: (1) During the debate on the recent bill
proposed by Senator Hollings to limit foreign direct investment by
foreign corporations in the United States, the president of the Commu-
nications Workers of America, Morton Bahr, was called as a witness on
the proposed takeover of Voicestream by Deutsche Telekom. In his
testimony he emphasized how “in the telecommunications industry, the
presence of Deutsche Telekom in our marketplace could yield some
substantial beneﬁts to workers and consumers.” (2) Another example is
the debate on H1-B visas, where Silicon Valley executives trooped before
the Congress, warning of a Y2K computer disaster unless the number of
H1-B visas was increased.
THE AGING POPULATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY
With the aging of the population, the proportion of voters eligible to
receive social security payments to the elderly has increased, and these
pensions are by far the largest component of government transfers in all
industrial economies. Indeed, in the rich countries, the ratio of people of
working age to those over age 65, currently about four to one, is expected
to fall by half by the year 2030. Razin and Sadka (1999) examines the
implications of this ongoing increase in the size of the social security
transfer system for the welfare state, focusing particularly on the rela-
tionship between aging of the population and the tax rates and beneﬁts
involved. The paper develops a model in which the size of the taxes and
social transfers between the working-age population and the retired is
endogenously determined by voting. That is, the extent of taxation and
redistribution policy is decided by democratic voting, with the political-
economy equilibrium determined as a balance between those who gain
and those who lose from a more extensive tax-and-transfer policy. The
aging of the population and the consequent increase in the dependency
ratio affect the political-economy balance in two directions: The greater
number of retirees increases demand for beneﬁts, but at the same time it
reduces the willingness of the working-age population to accede to
higher taxes and transfers, since current workers are net losers from the
welfare state—the “ﬁscal leakage” effect. We show that the outcome of
the model in which both workers and retirees vote on the level of taxes
and social beneﬁts is that a higher dependency rate may well lead to an
equilibrium with lower taxes and transfers.
Our conclusions are consistent with the standard theory of the
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which the size of government or the scope of redistribution depends on
pre-tax income inequality. Two economic interpretations are used to
explain this dependence. Lovell (1975) emphasizes the size of the gov-
ernment as a provider of public goods, while others, notably Meltzer and
Richard (1981), consider the role of the government in redistributing
income. See Persson and Tabellini (1999) for a recent survey. In both
applications, the size of government or the scope of redistribution
depends on a particular measure of the skewedness of the income
distribution, the ratio of the pre-tax median income to the pre-tax average
income. This ratio represents the price of collectively supplied goods in
terms of private goods for the median voter. Our model adds a new
channel through which the size of government is determined, namely, the
effect of the “ﬁscal leakage” that occurs in the pay-as-you-go social
security system, in which current workers are net contributors while the
retired are net beneﬁciaries.
Empirical evidence using panel data on twelve European countries
from 1974 to 1992 provides strong support for our theory. These welfare
states share common institutional features, including tax rates on labor
income ranging from 40 to 50 percent, transfers constituting 20 to 30
percent of GDP, and dependency ratios approaching one-half of the
population. While the institutions are broadly similar, taxes and transfers
vary across the twelve countries and are found to depend on demo-
graphic characteristics, as proxied by the dependency ratio. The depen-
dency ratio has a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect on both the labor
tax rate and the generosity of per-capita transfers, after controlling for
income skewedness as suggested by the standard theory and for a
number of social and demographic control variables. Because the age
structure of the population is not affected by annual changes in tax or
beneﬁt rates, the econometric ﬁnding that the dependency ratio affects the
parameters of the welfare state is unlikely to be sensitive to a problem of
reverse causality (see Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002b).
These results shed light on the current debate over privatization of
the social security systems in the industrial countries. Privatization of
social security is typically viewed as providing for individual-speciﬁc
balances between total discounted contributions and total discounted
beneﬁts. That is, the privatized system does not redistribute income, but
instead simply provides a publicly run (and in many cases, mandatory)
mechanism for savings. Privatization would eliminate the payroll tax/
transfer element of national social security systems, cutting both the
payroll tax burden and the size of public transfers. Our model can thus
explain the rising calls for privatization in light of the aging of the
population.
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